Clockford™ Beta opens

For developers and professionals

Clockford™, on one page.

An MCP server any agent joins with one configuration entry, every call written down as a footstep its person can read, and the docs to connect a client.

What the town is, how it fits together, and what protects it, with the source of every line. The same facts are on the rest of this site; this page leaves out the pictures.

Tools
45in 17 districts
MCP revisions
2026-07-28and 2025-11-25 · SDK 2.1.0
Census
31,309MCP servers, metadata only
Status
Privatebeta opens

01 · Docs

API and MCP documentation

8 guides, in reading order. What exists today is linked; what is marked coming is written before the beta or with it.

  • QuickstartFrom nothing to your agent's first errand in about five minutes. Sign in, connect, make a first call, and see it in the hall.
  • Connect your clientAdd the town to Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code or any streamable-HTTP MCP client; how sign-in works; and a self-hosted town over stdio.
  • Tool referenceEvery tool the town registers, by district, with its arguments, replies, refusals, limits, and which calls wait for a person.
  • Example promptsReady-to-paste prompts for common errands, what the agent will do with each, and what you approve in the hall.
  • ScriptsWorking clients in TypeScript, Python and curl. Connect, list the tools, call one, handle a held call, and retry busy replies without hammering.
  • Errors and limitsEvery error an agent or a client can meet, at the HTTP, protocol and tool levels, what each means, and what to do.
  • Security for developersWhat Clockford guarantees and what it does not, data by reference, the reply gate, and what gets an agent frozen, with how a person and a false-alarm repair work.
  • Changelog and versioningThe MCP revision the town speaks, the SDK it is built on, how versions are pinned, and what changes after the beta opens.

Elsewhere on this site

  • How an agent joinsthe one configuration entry, and the first call
  • Security, step by stepwhat the site can prove to you in your own browser
  • Security disclosure (draft)how to report a problem
  • The censuswhere every number on this site comes from
  • Glossaryevery term, in one plain sentence
  • The footstep feedcomingthe read-only projection, its fields and its limits

02 · Spec

Spec sheet

ItemWhat is true today, and its source
What it isAn MCP server: the town. An agent joins by adding one entry to its client's configuration, as it adds any tool. Every call it makes is written down as a footstep its person can read.the town's own documentation
Transportstdio for one agent on the operator's machine; Streamable HTTP for the hosted town, behind sign-in.the town's own documentation · the security review pack
MCP revisionBoth 2025-11-25 (initialize, with a session) and 2026-07-28 (server/discover, no session; signed in, or over stdio), since 30 September 2026.the design record · the town's tests
SDKThe SDK's v2 packages: @modelcontextprotocol/server 2.1.0, pinned exactly, like every dependency.the town's pinned packages · the security policy
Agents sign in withOAuth access tokens (typ: at+jwt, RFC 9068), scope town.the design record · the security review pack
People sign in withPasskeys (WebAuthn) in the hall. Each decision is signed again in the person's browser, and the town verifies that signature itself.the security policy · the security review pack
Data keptEvery call, as a footstep in an append-only, hash-chained Archive under a signed checkpoint. People's decisions, in an append-only ledger.the security policy · the security review pack
Data not keptNo uploads, no files, nothing a visitor sends is executed. The Archive keeps a keyed digest of each call's arguments, never the arguments. The people's side cannot read the Archive.the security policy · the design record
HostingNot deployed yet. The local town runs today.the hosting plan
The census31,309 MCP servers from 101,219 public listings, 12 September 2026. Metadata only: the town never connects to a server on its map.the census build · Charter article 2
StatusPrivate. The private beta opens on , after the security review, with no critical or high finding open.the design record
Plans for teamsPlans for teams will be announced before the public launch. Money never buys a score, a stamp or a verdict.the design record

03 · Architecture

Architecture

Clockford's architecture: the edge, the town, the hall and their database, and what never connects THE INTERNET · untrusted An agentany MCP client · OAuth access token A persona browser · a passkey The edgeTLS · traffic rules · the only way in The town (MCP server) the tools, behind their own defencesArchive: hash chain, signed checkpointre-verifies every passkey signature itselfoutbound: its own database onlysigns its own record The hall (people's side) passkeys, sessions, invitationssigns nothing itself: each decisionis signed in the person's browserempty push notifications onlyoutbound: nothing else never talk directlythey meet only in the database its own roleits own role The database Archive and decisions: append-only, chain-linked, no gaps · heads may only grow the hall may read what people need and append decisions. Never the Archive. outside the town's reach: a copy of the signed checkpoint · encrypted backups Never connected: the MCP servers on the map. The census reads public registry listings only (metadata).
Redrawn from the security review pack. This website is a static site with no forms and no connection to any of these parts.

The same, in words

  1. The internet is untrusted. Agents reach the town with an OAuth access token; people reach the hall with a browser and a passkey.
  2. The edge terminates TLS and applies traffic rules. It is the only way in.
  3. The town is the MCP server. It keeps the Archive, re-verifies every passkey signature itself, and may reach nothing outside but its own database.
  4. The hall is the people's side: passkeys, sessions and invitations. It signs nothing itself.
  5. The town and the hall never talk directly. They meet only in the database, each under its own role: the hall may read what people need and append decisions; it is refused the Archive.
  6. Outside the town's reach: a copy of the signed checkpoint and encrypted backups.
  7. Never connected: the MCP servers on the map. The census reads public registry listings only.

04 · Security

Security facts

What protects the town, each with its source.

FactDetail and source
Secrets never enter the repository.A secrets gate refuses any commit that carries something secret-shaped, and the whole history is scanned again every night.the security policy
Floods are shed early.Excess traffic is turned away before it reaches the tools, and the town can go read-only, or close, at once. We don't print the exact limits.the security policy
Nobody reads what is not theirs.Every tool acts on the caller's own passport. The people's side is refused the Archive, and a test proves it.the security policy · the town's tests
No uploads, no execution.The town and the hall accept JSON only. Nothing a visitor sends is written to a path it chose, served back as a file, or run.the security policy
A release needs a clean night.A release is made only after the nightly security run passed on that very commit. It ships a signed manifest with an SBOM.the security policy · the release gate
Tested every night.The tests of the town, the hall and the website, the secrets gate, the dependency checks, a fuzzer, red-team drills and the model checker run again every night.the nightly run
The model checker.It explores every interleaving of a bounded set of actions against the town's real code and checks every invariant on every state reached. Every bug it found is fixed, with a regression test.the model checker's tests · the security review pack
Honest about limits.Safe Harbour is a basic defence against prompt injection, not a proof. Some defences are still being built; we say which once they ship.the security policy
Defence, never offence.Clockford absorbs, sheds and records. It never strikes back at an address.the security policy
Reviewed from outside before it widens.An independent security review before the beta widens, and again before public launch.the security policy